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HOW DISTINCTIVE SHOULD
CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS BE?
ROBERT K. VISCHER†
I was a teenager in the 1980s, and I was raised in evangelical
Christian circles through which I was encouraged to listen to
“Christian” rock music, not secular, which sometimes gave rise to
some casuistic line drawing:
• Does U2 count as Christian? Yes, because of that line in
Sunday Bloody Sunday about the victory Jesus won!1
• How about Bob Dylan? Yes, but only during his three-album
“born again” period!2
• Amy Grant? Definitely, but even after she crossed over into
the secular Top 40?3
• Does the song need to mention Jesus? What if it mentions
Jesus but also has a swear word?

One of the things that I found refreshing about being
Catholic is less preoccupation with line drawing, with the “in or
out” question, at least when it came to matters of cultural
engagement. In Catholic circles, I’ve never heard someone justify
or condemn listening to Bruce Springsteen based on whether he
can be considered a Catholic singer. He’s a great singer, and his
lyrics convey powerful truths about the human condition. That
he was raised Catholic has shaped his art, no question,4 but
isolating what precisely is “Catholic” about him—or how his
“Catholic-ness” makes him different from all non-Catholic
artists—would be an odd line of inquiry. We take him as he is in
a holistic encounter with his contribution to the true, the good,
and the beautiful.

†

Dean and Mengler Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law.
U2, Sunday Bloody Sunday, on WAR (Island Records 1983).
2
BOB DYLAN, SLOW TRAIN COMING (Columbia Records 1979); BOB DYLAN,
SAVED (Columbia Records 1980); BOB DYLAN, SHOT OF LOVE (Columbia Records 1981).
3
See, e.g., AMY GRANT, HEART IN MOTION (A&M Records 1991).
4
See, e.g., BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, BORN TO RUN (Columbia Records 1975).
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I’m grateful that John Breen and Lee Strang have taken on
this project. This is an important book. It is a worthy topic that
does not lend itself to easy answers, and they bring valuable
insight through their meticulous research and analysis.
That said, there were a few times reading it when I
harkened back to my fourteen-year-old self, wondering whether I
should be listening to the decidedly mediocre Christian metal
band Stryper rather than the unmistakably non-Christian but
brilliant Metallica. At times, the “in or out” line drawing loomed
large in my reading of Breen and Strang’s text. Maybe that’s just
the lens I bring, but I want to explore it a bit.
It should matter that a law school is Catholic, to be sure.
But I think Breen and Strang may simultaneously be claiming
too much and too little. They may claim too much by seeming to
suggest that Catholic legal education matters only to the extent
that it is distinctive. To cite a few examples of their focus on
distinctiveness:
[A]lthough Catholic legal education came into existence and for
a long time served the needs of underrepresented Catholics and
other groups excluded by non-Catholic law schools, today,
Catholic law schools’ rationales, mechanisms, and results are at
best equivalent to their non-Catholic peers.5
[T]hese reasons—securing additional revenue, enjoying
institutional prestige, contributing to the public good, and
promoting academic inquiry—would justify the existence of any
university-sponsored law school. They do not justify the
particular existence of a Catholic law school as such. Put
another way, these rationales would justify the presence of a
law school as part of a university, but not as a Catholic
university.6
[I]n establishing legal clinics, Catholic law schools were
following a trend rather than boldly marking out a space of
special concern. They were not leaders in the vanguard of legal
education, but disciples who jumped on the clinical bandwagon.7

This last quote—conveying a rather dismissive attitude toward
Catholic law schools’ embrace of clinical legal education as a case
of bandwagon jumping—gave me pause. Would we look skeptically
5

John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal
Education in the United States 473 (Jan. 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the St. John’s Law Review).
6
Id. at 477.
7
Id. at 479.
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at a Christian anti-hunger organization like World Relief because
UNICEF has similar aims? Is it all a question of timing, of who’s
first to the space?
I do think that we need to be asking questions about why
Catholic legal education matters. In the Minnesota law-school
market, if the Catholic identity of St. Thomas does not render it any
different from the University of Minnesota or Mitchell-Hamline,
that’s a problem. And yet, I think it’s possible to overstate the
need for distinctiveness. I wonder if the authors are claiming too
much on this point.
At the same time, I wonder if they are also claiming too little
by putting nearly all the weight on intellectual distinctives:
We argue that Catholic universities and law schools, and the
deans and faculty responsible for these schools, can indeed
justify their existence—that sound reasons exist to support and
continue Catholic legal education—only if one identifies a body
of thought capable of explaining and justifying the practice of
Catholic legal education as an intellectual endeavor.8

I agree that the intellectual dimension of Catholic legal education
is crucial, but I do not believe that it captures fully the potential
distinctiveness of Catholic legal education.
Consider Pope John Paul II’s admonition in Ex Corde
Ecclesiae that a Catholic university should be “an authentic
human community animated by the spirit of Christ.”9 That
phrase alone can become the impetus for a Catholic law school to
distinguish itself in terms of:
• The centrality of relationships (faculty-student research
projects, responsive teaching, mentoring programs, skills
coaching, peer support)
• The integration of a student’s faith commitments with his or
her professional development
• Opportunities for community members to engage in moral
reflection and growth
• Interprofessional exposure and collaboration10
• Attention to a narrative of meaning that can help a student
develop a sense of vocation11
8

Id. at 482–83 (emphasis omitted).
JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION EX CORDE ECCLESIAE ¶ 21 (1990).
10
For example, at St. Thomas Law, our clinical program is a collaboration
between law, social work, and professional psychology. Ministering to the client’s
whole person is a manifestation of our Catholic identity.
11
On these points generally, see, for example, Robert K. Vischer, How Should a
Law School’s Religious Affiliation Matter in a Difficult Market?, 48 U. TOL. L. REV.
9
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I don’t think any of these points of emphasis are captured fully
by the focus on Catholic legal education’s rationale being a
distinctive intellectual framework.
Two more practical questions emerge from Breen and Strang’s
analysis. First, what is the role of boundaries in Catholic legal
education? The authors assert that the Catholic intellectual
tradition’s anthropology “identifies boundaries to the law school’s
mission.”12 For example, “A class taught, or an article written by
a faculty member, or talk given by a dean that directly or
indirectly affirmed that humans lack free will would not fit this
anthropology.”13 Because “[t]he Catholic understanding of what
it means to be a human being is modest enough in scope that it
permits a wide variety of claims and perspectives on a wide variety
of legal issues,” the “anthropology would prevent few claims or
arguments about servitude law currently in circulation,” for
example.14
I’m not sure what weight the verb “prevent” is carrying in
the previous sentence. Does a need for boundaries suggest that
there are claims or arguments that should not be made in a
Catholic law school? (Note that I’m asking about claims to be
made in a Catholic law school, not by a Catholic law school,
which I believe is a different matter.15)
The pedagogical function of these boundaries is not entirely
clear. Breen and Strang explain:
[W]e are not arguing that a dean or other faculty member would
not be allowed to say there is no such thing as free will. Rather,
the presence of a Catholic anthropology will serve as a
counterpoint to which materialist/determinist theories should
respond. So, a faculty member can say those things, but if he
does, it would be incumbent upon him to point out that this is
not in keeping with the mission of the school.16

Without a doubt, this counterpoint function is important, but it
strikes me as important in both directions. In addition to
benefiting from learning Catholic anthropology as a counterpoint
307 (2017); Jerome M. Organ, From Those to Whom Much Has Been Given, Much is
Expected: Vocation, Catholic Social Teaching, and the Culture of a Catholic Law
School, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 361 (2004).
12
Breen & Strang, supra note 5, at 516.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 517.
15
See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Whom Should a Catholic Law School Honor? If
Confusion Is the Concern, Context Matters, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 243 (2010).
16
Breen & Strang, supra note 5, at 516 n.143.
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to materialist/determinist theories, students at a Catholic law
school would also benefit from having materialist/determinist
theories presented as a counterpoint to the Catholic anthropology.
Professors at a Catholic law school should be expected, I would
think, to present views in opposition to the Catholic tradition in
order to help students understand themselves as engaged
participants in a critical dialogue. By the same token, shouldn’t
professors at non-Catholic law schools do the same? What
precisely makes this commitment to counterpoint-driven
dialogical teaching distinctive for a Catholic law school?
Perhaps the distinctiveness derives not from the presentation
of counterpoints but from the professor’s vouching for the validity
of particular counterpoints. In other words, does the Catholic
law school’s distinctiveness require the professor to put his or her
thumb on the scale by saying “this is the view that is affirmed by
our mission”? If so, is that thumb on the scale intended to
prevent confusion because it is presumed that students have
already chosen to align with the tradition, or is the thumb
intended to have a persuasive function in and of itself?
For example, when I have taught abortion law, I ask
students to read thoughtful perspectives on both sides of the
issue. I make sure a range of views are presented in their most
compelling terms. I do not vouch for or against either side. Is
my teaching consistent with my responsibility as a Catholic
faculty member at a Catholic law school? If so, shouldn’t that
same responsibility extend to my work if I were on the faculty at
the University of Minnesota? If my approach is not consistent
with my responsibility as a faculty member at a Catholic law
school, why isn’t it? What else should I be saying?
The second broad question that emerges from my reading of
Breen and Strang: What is the appropriate role of the market or
professional relevance in defining Catholic legal education? I
have helped create and teach a required law school course
focused on the Catholic intellectual tradition. It is no easy feat.
There is a huge difference between an elective and a required
course in terms of securing student buy-in. It is very difficult to
pull off a required course grounded in the Catholic intellectual
tradition at a law school today. In my view, the difficulty stems
not so much from the contested nature of Catholic truth claims
but from questions of professional relevance. Many students
struggle with the notion that principles emerging from the
tradition are required elements of their development as lawyers.
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There is such pressure to maximize return on investment that
many law students are uncomfortable spending time and tuition
dollars on courses that may strike them as geared more toward
questions of good citizenship than effective lawyering.
Over the years, we have retooled our required course
repeatedly, gradually focusing less explicitly on Catholic
intellectual tradition and more on professional competencies,
reflective moral judgment, and building relationships of trust
with clients. I have begun to care less about the breadth and
depth of their knowledge of Catholic social teaching, for example,
and more about their comfort engaging in client-centered
counseling that integrates moral considerations.
I will illustrate the murkiness of Catholic identity in the
classroom with one more example. During orientation week at
St. Thomas, the first case I teach our new students is Buck v.
Bell, the Supreme Court case in which Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes proclaimed that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough” in upholding forced sterilizations against women deemed
mentally deficient.17 I also ask our students to read about human
dignity from a wide variety of perspectives, including Catholic,
Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and several nonreligious philosophies.
I then return to a discussion of Buck v. Bell through the lenses
offered by these perspectives. I do not put my thumb on the scale.
I try to equip students to express their own moral misgivings
about the ruling using language that resonates with them,
regardless of its source.
There is a smorgasbord aspect to this approach, to be sure.
My goal is to help students discern and articulate the connections
between the Supreme Court’s reasoning and the moral
commitments they are bringing with them into law school.
Whether or not these conversations are happening at nonCatholic law schools, it is not a distinctly Catholic conversation.
In fact, we strengthen the conversation by subsequently asking
students to read a great article by Harvard Law professor Joseph
Singer on the need for normative reasoning by lawyers.18
Professor Singer is not Catholic, and his article makes compelling
arguments for attorneys to become well-versed in moral reasoning
without ever invoking the Catholic intellectual tradition.

17

274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899
(2009).
18
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If we decided to ask St. Thomas Law students to discuss Buck
v. Bell in an intellectual framework that was distinctively Catholic,
what would that look like? And what would be the value for
students beyond the value presented by our current approach?
As the dean of a Catholic law school, I assuredly do not want
to lose sight of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Our
Catholic identity has to be meaningful, and Breen and Strang’s
exploration of this issue is enormously important to the extent
that it brings these questions to the surface. But I want to be
careful and gracious in my exploration of these questions, and I
do not want to unduly limit the worthy manifestations of
Catholic identity to those manifestations that are not exhibited
by non-Catholic law schools. Not everything going on in legal
education should be emulated by Catholic law schools, to be sure,
but sometimes our commitment to core values will lead us to
sound more like Metallica, less like Stryper. And I think that’s
okay.

